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The policy instruments that control dairy output and distribution in 1996 are basically
the  same  as  those  that  have  ruled  the  industry  for  half a  century.  Three  distinct,  but
interrelated, policy types comprise the major components of government interventions  in the
U.S. dairy market:  (1)  a price support program under which the federal government stands
ready to buy selected storable dairy products at minimum prices; (2) trade policies,  including
both import  barriers  and export  subsidies  that insulate  the  U.S.  domestic  market  from
competition  and  shift out the  demand  for certain  manufactured  dairy products;  and  (3)  a
marketing order system that regulates both regional milk prices paid by users and how these
prices are translated into farm level prices.  These three sets of policies combine to create a
complex  web of interrelationships that govern  all aspects of the market for milk and milk
products  in  the  United  States.  (See  Blaney,  Miller  and  Stillman,  1995  for  a  extended
discussion of the U.S.  dairy industry and policy.)
This paper considers the effects of alternative modifications of U.S. dairy policy.  For
the  formal  quantitative  analysis we draw  on the University of Wisconsin-Madison  Dairy
Interregional Competition Model (IRCM) that has been used extensively over the last several
years to consider a wide variety  of policy  options.  We use the  model to consider several
specific proposals that were prominent in the dairy policy debate leading to the 1996 Federal
Agricultural  Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act.  In each case we consider the effects of
a specific option relative to a scenario that replicates  the dairy market and policy situation
in  1993  (referred  to  as  BASE).  The  options  we  consider  include:  (1)  deregulation  of
marketing orders coupled with elimination of price supports (referred  to as the Freedom  to
Milk scenario);  (2) a complex mix that includes modification of marketing orders to change
some regional effects while eliminating the price support on certain products and reducing
the price support on other products (referred to as the House Compromise scenario); and, (3)
the actual Dairy Title of the FAIR Act of 1996 (referred to as the 1996 FAIR Act Dairy  Title
scenario).  We  also  evaluate  two  additional  variants  on the  1996 FAIR Act Dairy Title
scenario.  These scenarios measure the impacts of  the provision to eliminate the price support
program by the year 2000 under two alternative assumptions about world prices for butter,
nonfat dry milk (NDM) and American  cheese.  These scenarios are referred to as NO CCC.
Low World Prices  and NO CCC. High World Prices.Proceedings
Each of the policy options  analysed  includes  a number of specific features  and  is
described in some detail below.  None of the options  includes changes  in trade barriers or
export subsidies and, in fact,  no serious trade policy reform was contemplated  in the policy
discussions  leading to the FAIR Act.  This is despite the fact that trade barriers are, perhaps,
the most significant  feature of U.S. dairy policy.
This paper does not review the legislative history or future political feasibility of the
options considered.  Our purpose is more academic in that we consider these specific options
in  order  to  learn  what  such  analysis  can  teach  us  about the  operation  of the  U.S.  dairy
industry and the underlying economics of alternative policies.  We do not suggest that the
alternatives we consider are the modifications most likely to be included in future  legislation,
however, they were each serious proposals for the 1996 Act.  This paper also does not review
the large academic  literature that considers the implications of  various stylized dairy policies.
The research papers  and  USDA reports we  cite  include  many of the key references  and
reviews of that literature.
The  final  section  of the  paper  examines  potential  implications  of alternative  U.S.
program options for dairy trade and trade relations with Canada.  In light of the analysis of
each program option developed in the paper we consider if the alternative  chosen for U.S.
reform has significant  implications with respect to dairy trade issues with Canada.
U.S.  DAIRY POLICY INSTRUMENTS:  A  BROAD BRUSH  DESCRIPTION
Before considering the specific  options  and their effects it is useful to provide a brief
description of the major U.S.  dairy policy instruments.
Price Supports
The USDA agrees to purchase  butter, non-fat dry milk (NDM), and American Cheese
from processors  at prices  calculated  to  ensure  that  the  farm  price  of milk  used  for the
manufacture  of those  products  will  generally  remain  above  the  legislated  support  price
($10.10 per hundredweight  in  1995  and $10.35 in  1996).  In 1990,  a tax on milk production
was included in the price  support program to limit milk output while directly offsetting dairy
program budget costs.  Farmers pay a specific per-unit assessment that has averaged  a little
under one percent of  the market price.  An added wrinkle to the program has been a refund
of assessments  to farms whose milk output did not grow from one year to the next and an
upward adjustment in the assessment rate on other farms to make up for the lost government
revenue.
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Trade Policies
Trade barriers are a fundamental feature of U.S. dairy policy.  In general,  imports of
dairy  products  in the United States  have been limited  to a  small percentage  of domestic
consumption of manufactured dairy products.  The import barriers allow the domestic price
of milk  and  milk products  to remain  well  above  the price  for traded  products  in  world
markets; thus making price discrimination policies feasible.  The system of absolute quotas
gave  way to a  system of tariff-rate  quotas  (TRQs)  as a part of the Uruguay Round trade
agreement which took force on July  1, 1995.  However, the second-tier tariffs that limit over-
quota imports remain prohibitively high; therefore,  the effects of the TRQs remain the same
as the absolute quotas that were replaced.  The Uruguay Round agreement also provides  for
a gradual  increase in the quantity of dairy product imports into the United States under the
TRQs.  This provision will allow for a gradual increase in import access into the U.S. dairy
market over the next 5 years.
Subsidized  exports  have  long been  used,  along  with donations  to domestic  food
programs and international  food aid,  to dispose of stocks of dairy products  acquired under
the price support program.  Subsidized exports  have been considered  a market for U.S. dairy
products that would not  disrupt commercial  sales.  In addition  to disposal of government
stocks,  the Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP) has provided explicit price subsidies for
commercial dairy product exports since  1989.
Marketing Orders
Unlike the price support  and  international trade programs,  marketing  orders,  even
when applied under federal legislation,  are regional  in their implementation.  Some regions
have state marketing orders for milk, and some have no marketing orders.  All federal  milk
marketing  orders  and  the major state  milk marketing  orders  establish  specific minimum
prices that must be paid for milk according to its end-use class (classified pricing).  They also
provide for pool pricing  such that  individual  farmers receive  a weighted average price of
milk sold in their marketing order.  Federal milk marketing orders calculate  a separate pool
price  for all milk under each of the  34 regional  orders (Neff and Plato,  1995).
Federal marketing orders operate with at least three classes of  milk by end use.  These
classes provide separate  markets and pricing for milk used  in fluid, and for manufactured
products  such as yogurt, cheese, butter or NDM.  California,  which accounts  for about 15
percent of U.S.  milk supply and operates  its own marketing order, has two pool prices that
based on two separate weighted averages  of prices for five end-use classes.  Further, unlike
farmers under federal orders, individual  farmers in California receive  a weighted average of
the two pool prices,  with these weights determined by individual ownership of milk quota
(Sumner and Wolf,  1995).
Each marketing  order regulates  milk within a  geographically  limited market.  The
relationship  of prices  among orders  is  determined,  in  part,  by  the  formula  used  to  set
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minimum prices in the orders themselves.  The price of unregulated Grade  B milk produced
in the Minnesota-Wisconsin  region  is the basis for the minimum price for Class I milk in the
lowest-price  federal  order.  The  Class  I differential  (and,  therefore  the minimum  Class I
price)  is  generally higher the further the region  is from the Wisconsin.
With different  minimum prices in each region, regulations are needed to prevent milk
from being transported  across regions so as to undermine the maintenance of separate fluid
milk  markets  in  different  orders.  The  regulations  insure  that  there  is  generally  little
economic advantage  to arbitrage across prices in different  orders.
DAIRY  TRADE  AND  "DOMESTIC" POLICY
U.S. dairy policy has several elements that generally  keep the domestic prices of dairy
products  above those in most potential export markets.  First,  import barriers  in the  form of
TRQs (and,  for some products relatively high transport  costs) are sufficient  to insulate the
domestic U.S. market from world supply and demand.  This is a necessary condition  for U.S.
prices to remain above the prices that prevail  in world markets.  Second,  the price support
program  requires government purchases of dairy products  at minimum  prices that are well
above the prices  at which these products typically trade in international markets.  This means
that  rather  than  being  exported  by  commercial  firms  these  products  are  sold  to  the
government.  Third, the marketing order system assures relatively high prices  for fluid milk
and stimulates milk production  in relatively high  cost regions.  Fourth,  subsidized  exports
under the DEIP contribute  to higher domestic  U.S. prices for milk by drawing product out
of the domestic market.
Under classified pricing, (and with import barriers  in place) buyers are required to pay
different prices  for identical  milk depending  on the  intended  end  use of the  commodity.
Classified pricing has had its most dramatic  effects  creating higher prices  for fluid products
while  lowering prices  for manufactured  products.  However,  price discrimination  among
manufactured products  is becoming more evident in the  current system and in some of the
options  for policy changes.  (For example,  the House Compromise option provides  for wide
price differentials between milk used for cheese  and milk used for butter and NDM.)
This price  discrimination  can take many  forms  and could  be tailored to  stimulate
exports without including an explicit subsidy tied to the  export of a particular product.  For
example,  some  dairy products  are more likely to be destined  for export markets  and others
are  much more  likely destined  for  domestic  use.  Given this tendency,  classified  pricing
could be used to set high prices  for those products  likely to be consumed by domestic buyers
and  lower  prices  for  products  likely  to  be  exported,  even  though  the  products  were
manufactured  from identical milk.  Classifications  by end-use  category may be  defined such
that export-bound  products  are  grouped together and  assigned relatively  low milk prices.
Products  destined for domestic  consumption may be grouped into  classes that are assigned
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higher milk prices.  Finally, the end-use prices  and classifications  can be adjusted such that
producer  revenue  is insulated  from  any  drop in  the price  of those products  destined  for
export.  One result is that the price paid by export buyers may be below both the price paid
by  domestic  consumers  and  the price received  by  producers.  (Sumner,  1996,  analyses
several such options and discusses their export implications.)
OVERVIEW OF THE UW-MADISON  DAIRY  IRCM AND  THE BASE  SCENARIO
The  UW-Madison  Dairy  IRCM  is  a  multi-region,  multi-product  interregional
competition model that balances  regional supplies  and demands (See Cox; Cox and Jesse;
Cox,  Chavas  and Jesse;  and  Chavas,  Cox  and  Jesse  for  more  details  on  the model,  its
development and the empirical  specification of the underlying  equations  and parameters).
The Dairy IRCM has  13 regions  (see Table  1), nine wholesale dairy products  (see Table 2)
and farm-level milk priced on three components: fat, protein, and lactose.  The Dairy IRCM
was designed to consider potential reform of the federal and state milk marketing orders  and
other policies.  It therefore  includes substantial regional  detail.  Important production  areas
such  as California  and the Upper Midwest (which includes  Wisconsin,  Minnesota,  North
Dakota and South Dakota) are each modelled as separate regions.  Each of the  13 regions is
allowed  to have  different  supply  functions,  farm  level  prices,  and  different  aggregate
wholesale demands  determined by population.
The Dairy IRCM generates a spatial equilibrium across regions by adjusting regional
prices, production,  and trade.  In the model, dairy product price differences  between regions
cannot be greater than  transportation  costs or additional  interregional  trade  would occur.
Mileage between regions, three different transportation cost rates (raw milk, refrigerated and
non-refrigerated),  and federal and California milk marketing order regulations are explicitly
modelled.'  The model  uses regional  component  pricing,  so the farm level  value of fat,
protein, and lactose are generated regionally  as are production of farm milk and production
and consumption wholesale products.  The model does not examine  the evolution of policy
changes  or  reactions  to  them  over  time;  rather,  it  presents  annual  results  under  the
assumption that a policy has be fully implemented  and  adjustments have taken place.  All
adjustments  are assumed to occur over an intermediate-run  time horizon of 3 to 5 years.
'The model  incorporates a single blend price under the California marketing order and
thus does not reflect the supply effects of the two pool price system as analysed by Sumner  and
Wolf.  This likely  means that the model over estimates the supply  effects of the scenarios that
change the price of manufacturing milk.  However,  it also means that the effective supply price
in California  is less affected  by changes in Class I prices.
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Table 1.  Producing  and  Consuming  Regions  of Fluid  and Manufactured Dairy
Products in the U.S.  Dairy Sector IRCM.
1.  California
2.  Central:  Kentucky,  Tennessee
3.  East North Central:  Illinois,  Indiana, Michigan,  Ohio
4.  East South Central:  Alabama, Arkansas,  Louisiana,  Mississippi
5.  Middle-Atlantic:  New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania
6.  Mountain:  Arizona, Colorado,  Montana, Nevada,  Utah,  Wyoming
7.  North East:  Connecticut,  Massachusetts,  Maine, New Hampshire,  Rhode
Island, Vermont
8.  North West:  Idaho, Oregon, Washington
9.  South Atlantic:  District of Columbia,  Delaware,  Maryland,  Virginia,  West
Virginia
10.  South East:  Florida, Georgia,  North Carolina,  South Carolina
11.  West South Central:  New Mexico,  Oklahoma,  Texas
12.  West Central:  Iowa,  Kansas,  Missouri, Nebraska
13.  Upper Midwest:  Wisconsin,  Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota
In order to consider the effects of policy change we compare each alternative to the
BASE scenario.  The BASE scenario simulates conditions  in the  1993 U.S. dairy sector. The
BASE scenario  is characterized  by: (1) budget assessments of $0.1125/cwt,  (2)  a farm level
price  support  of  $10.10/cwt  (operationalized  as  purchase  prices  of  $1.12/pound  for
American  cheese,  $0.65/pound  for  butter,  and  $1.034/pound  for NDM),  (3)  federal  milk
marketing  orders  (classified  pricing,  Eau Claire  based  Class  I differentials,  Minnesota-
Wisconsin (MW) minimum price for Class III products  and Class I "mover",  etc.)  and, (4)
California pricing rules  for California  (including California  fluid  standards in California).
In  addition,  this  scenario  assumes  that  the  DEIP  operates  at  the  5 year  average  of its
maximum  allowable export subsidies  on cheese,  butter,  and NDM (as provided under the
Uruguay Round GATT agreement)  and that government  domestic donations  are continued
at  the  5  year  average  rates  (roughly  2.4  billion  pounds  of milk  equivalent  total  solids
(METS)).
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Nonfat Dry Milk (NDM):
All Other Mfg (Resid
MFG):
Beverage fluid milk including regular and flavored
milk (whole, 2%,  1%,  skim) and buttermilk.
Cream (Half and Half, heavy and light), sour cream,
yogurt,  eggnog, cottage cheese.
Ice-cream,  ice-milk, sherbet,  frozen dairy mix and
mellorine.
Butter.
American,  Cheddar, Colby, Monterey  and processed
American cheese.
Mozzarella,  Provolone,  Parmesan, Romano and
Ricotta.
Swiss, Edam, Gouda, Brick, Muenster,  Gruyere, cream
cheese and all other cheeses.
Nonfat dry milk.
Canned and bulk whole milk and skim milk,  dry whole
milk and buttermilk,  and dry whey products.
In each alternative  scenario except the final NO CCC. High World Prices  scenario,
relatively low exogenous world market prices are assumed for butter ($0.69/pound),  NDM
($0.70/pound),  and American cheese  ($0.83/pound).
2 These low world price assumptions
yield a butter/NDM  milk equivalent world price of around $6.20/cwt.
The  ability  of mathematical  simulations  to precisely  mimic  market  behaviour  is
limited  (see  Cox  and  Jesse).  In  this  context,  comparing  the  changes  induced  by  the
alternative  scenarios relative  to the BASE is preferred to comparing the absolute  changes
2Most scenarios presented here were also evaluated  at considerably higher world market
prices: butter ($0.82/pound), NDM ($0.90/pound),  and American  cheese ($0.97/pound).  These
high world price assumptions yield a butter/NDM (Class IIIa or Class IV) milk equivalent price
around $8.50/cwt and tend to lower the losses (increase the gains) generated by dropping price
supports in the alternative  scenarios.  Hence,  use of the lower world prices generates  a somewhat
less optimistic assessment of the likely impacts of these scenarios.
Below we explicitly  examine the differential  impact of these alternative world price
assumptions when the U.S. price support program is ended.
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(say  from  current  reality)  generated  by  the  alternative  scenarios.  The  results  below
summarize  the  aggregate  wholesale  and  regional  farm  level  impacts  of the  alternative
scenarios  as percentage  changes  from the BASE results.  Other results  are also presented
relative to the projections under the BASE scenario.
ALTERNATIVE  POLICY OPTIONS:  DESCRIPTIONS AND  IMPLICATIONS
We  believe  it  is  instructive  to  present  the  results  from  the two  major  alternative
proposals that were rejected  in the  1995/96 dairy policy debate,  along with a more detailed
look  at the actual policy that was adopted  in the Dairy  Title of the FAIR Act.  The policy
scenarios will each be described in just enough  detail to allow the reader to understand the
major features that were modelled.  Following the description the projections  for milk market
aggregates  from the policy alternative  are discussed.  We begin with the  so called Freedom
to Milk proposal that was easily the most radical reform seriously considered  for the  1996.
Freedom to  Milk
This is basically  a deregulation  scenario with transition payments made to producers
based on the average of the best three of the past five year milk sales.  A 5 year average of
these payments (roughly  10 cents per cwt) is incorporated  in the modelling of this scenario.
Two key components of the Freedom to Milk deregulation  are the removal of price supports
on all products  and the elimination of both the federal and California milk marketing orders.
In  addition,  the  producer  assessments  ($0.1125/cwt)  and  the  government  donations  (2.4
billion METS) of the BASE scenario are removed.  Import barriers remain and imports  are
fixed at  1993 quantities.  Export subsidies may remain available, but they are irrelevant given
that prices for butter and NDM fall to world market levels.
Eliminating  milk  marketing  orders  reduces  fluid  milk  prices  by  17  percent
($2.45/cwt),  increases fluid production/consumption  by 3 percent (1.6  billion pounds), and
reduces fluid revenues by almost  15 percent  ($1.1  billion) (see Table 3).  As shown in Table
4,  the  aggregate  farm  milk  price and  farm production  each  drop by  roughly  2.5  percent
($0.33/cwt and 3.7 billion pounds).  With less total milk production and increased fluid milk
consumption,  manufacturing  milk markets tighten considerably.  As a result, production of
each  cheese  type  falls (From  Table  3:  American  cheese,  -6  percent;  Italian  cheese,  -3
percent;  and other  cheese,  -8  percent)  and  total  cheese production  falls by  349 million
pounds.  Also in Table  3, cheese prices rise (American cheese, 2 percent;  Italian cheese,  12
percent;  and other cheese,  13  percent).  Butter/NDM prices  fall to near world market levels
because they are no longer supported by government purchases.  NDM production falls by
18 percent  (173  million pounds).  Finally,  soft and frozen product outputs  fall by 5 percent
and 7 percent,  while prices rise by  14 percent and 24 percent.  These aggregate  wholesale
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sector results are national  in scope.  There are significant regional variations in the farm level
impacts that are discussed next.
Table 3.  Aggregate and Regional Wholesale  Sector Summary:  Percentage Changes from
BASE
Freedom  to  House  1996 Fair Act  No  CCC:  Low  No  CCC: High
BASE  Milk  (%)  Compromise  Dairy Title  World Prices  World Prices
(%)  (%)  (%/)  (%)
WHOLESALE  PRICES  ($/cwt)
Fluid  14.08  -17.4  10.3  -1.7  -6.6  -3.3
Soft  24.23  13.9  -0.4  -1.3  9.2  -2.1
American Cheese  105.40  2.4  -0.2  -2.7  -10.4  -4.9
Italian Cheese  84.36  11.5  11.1  -3.6  -8.3  -11.7
Other Cheese  81.43  13.3  2.2  -2.3  4.6  -0.2
Butter  60.67  -6.4  -11.0  0.6  -8.9  14.1
Frozen  18.85  24.4  -4.0  -0.9  19.1  0.8
Residual  Mfg  36.16  -5.6  4.4  -0.0  2.2  2.2
NFDM  99.34  -33.5  -43.2  -2.8  -42.3  -22.7
WHOLESALE  PRODUCTION (million  pounds)
Fluid  54,049  3.1  -1.8  0.3  1.2  0.6
Soft  4,027  -5.2  0.2  0.5  -3.5  0.8
American  Cheese  3,130  -6.1  -2.0  -4.4  -4.2  -5.1
Italian  Cheese  2,467  -2.9  -2.8  0.9  2.1  2.9
Other Cheese  1,066  -8.0  -1.3  1.4  -2.8  0.1
Butter  1,284  1.5  10.0  -0.2  -3.8  -4.0
Frozen  7,639  -7.2  1.2  0.3  -5.6  -0.2
Residual Mfg  4,219  1.5  -10.0  0.0  -0.6  -0.6
NFDM  963  -18.1  10.0  -1.6  -22.7  -13.1
WHOLESALE  CONSUMPTION  EXPENDITURES  (million $)
Fluid  7,561  -14.8  8.2  -1.4  -5.5  -2.7
Soft  972  7.9  -0.2  -0.8  5.4  -1.3
American Cheese  3,025  2.0  -0.2  -2.3  -8.9  -4.1
Italian Cheese  2,070  8.3  8.0  -2.8  -6.4  -9.1
Other Cheese  1,076  6.0  1.1  -1.2  2.3  -0.1
Butter  616  -4.9  -8.6  0.5  -6.9  10.2
Frozen  1,431  15.4  -2.8  -0.7  12.4  0.5
Residual Mfg  1,388  -4.0  3.1  -0.0  1.6  1.6
NFDM  540  -23.3  -32.0  -1.5  -31.2  -14.7
TOTAL U.S.  18,679  -4.0  3.0  -1.4  -4.0  -2.8148  Proceedings
Table 4.  Aggregate and Regional Summary of Farm Level Impacts:  Percentage Changes
from BASE Scenario
Freedom  to  House  1996 Fair Act  No  CCC:  Low  No  CCC: High
BASE  Milk (%)  Compromise  Dairy Title  (%)  World Prices  World Prices
(%)  (%)  (%)
FARM LEVEL PRICES  ($/cwt)
North East  14.08  -9.0  -0.1  -0.8  -2.7  -2.2
Mid-Atlantic  13.30  -4.7  1.7  -0.9  -2.8  -2.3
South Atlantic  13.78  -9.4  -1.1  -0.6  -2.3  -3.2
South East  15.14  -10.6  -1.5  -0.6  -5.2  -3.1
Central  13.89  -7.9  -0.5  -0.8  -5.7  -4.4
E. South Central  14.22  -11.1  -0.7  -0.7  -2.9  -3.3
W. South Central  13.20  -7.0  1.1  -0.6  -0.6  -0.7
E. North Central  13.71  -9.1  0.5  -0.9  -5.1  -2.5
Upper Midwest  11.84  4.2  4.1  -1.1  -4.9  -3.2
West Central  12.79  -4.3  1.3  -1.0  -4.2  -2.6
North  West  11.68  2.0  2.4  -1.9  -6.4  -3.5
Mountain  12.29  0.0  1.8  -1.1  -1.1  -1.2
California  11.40  3.1  2.5  -2.1  -6.4  -0.4
TOTAL  U.S.  12.68  -2.6  1.7  -1.1  -4.3  -2.4
FARM  LEVEL PRODUCTION (million  pounds)
North  East  4,500  -2.6  -0.0  -0.2  -0.8  -0.6
Mid-Atlantic  21,617  -2.9  1.0  -0.5  -1.7  -1.4
South  Atlantic  3,789  -1.0  -0.1  -0.1  -0.3  -0.4
South  East  5,998  -6.9  -1.0  -0.4  -3.4  -2.0
Central  4,220  -11.2  -0.7  -1.2  -8.1  -6.3
E. South Central  2,952  -6.4  -0.4  -0.4  -1.7  -1.9
W. South Central  9,713  -4.7  0.8  -0.4  -0.4  -0.4
E. North  Central  15,582  -9.0  0.5  -0.9  -5.1  -2.5
Upper Midwest  34,767  0.7  0.7  -0.2  -0.9  -0.5
West Central  8,923  -6.2  1.9  -1.5  -6.0  -3.8
North West  9,527  1.0  1.2  -1.0  -3.2  -1.8
Mountain  5,212  0.0  0.8  -0.5  -0.5  -0.5
California  22,857  1.1  0.8  -0.7  -2.2  -01
TOTAL U.S.  149,657  -2.5  0.7  -0.6  -2.3  -13
FARM LEVEL TOTAL REVENUES  (million $)
North  East  633  -11.4  -0.2  -1.1  -3.5  -28
Mid-Atlantic  2,875  -7.5  2.7  -1.4  -4.5  -3.7
South Atlantic  522  -10.3  -1.2  -0.7  -2.5  -3.6
South East  908  -16.8  -2.5  -1.0  -8.5  -5.1
Central  586  -18.2  -1.1  -2.0  -13.3  -10.4
E. South Central  420  -16.8  -1.0  -1.1  -4.5  -5.1
W.  South Central  1.282  -11.4  1.9  -1.1  -1.0  -1.1
E. North Central  2,136  -17.3  0.9  -1.8  -10.0  -4.9
Upper Midwest  4,116  4.9  4.8  -1.3  -5.7  -37
West  Central  1,141  -10.3  3.2  -2.5  -10.0  -6.3
North West  1,112  3.0  3.6  -2.9  -9.4  -52
Mountain  640  0.1  2.6  -1.6  -1.7  -1.8
California  2,605  4.3  3.3  -2.8  -8.5  -05
TOTAL  U.S.  18,976  -5.0  2.4  -1.7  -6.6  -3.7Cox and Sumner
Table 5.  Aggregate  Welfare and Revenue  Impacts:  Percentage  Changes  from BASE
Scenario
Freedom  to  House  1996 Fair Act  No CCC:  Low  No  CCC: High
BASE  Milk  Compromise  Diry Title  World Prices  World Prices
(%)  (%)  (%)  (%)  (%)
AGGREGATE  WELFARE SUMMARY  (million $)
Producer  2,706  -1.7  1.2  -0.8  -3.0  -1.6
Consumer  4,358  1.7  -1.6  0.8  2.0  1.5
TOTAL  7,064  0.4  0.5  0.2  0.1  0.3
AGGREGATE  REVENUE/COST  SUMMARY  (million $)
Farm  18,976  -5.0  2.4  -1.7  -6.6  -3.7
Consumer  18,679  -4.0  3.0  -1.4  -4.0  -2.8
Government  441  -66.9  -71.1  18.3  -100.0  -100.0
As a result of increased cheese prices  and more access  to fluid markets, regions that
now produce  milk used primarily  for manufactured products (Upper Midwest, Northwest,
California, and Mountain: these regions  accounted  for 48 percent of 1993  milk production)
are projected to have increases in farm price, production and total revenue while regions that
now have high Class I utilization suffer sizable losses.  In these regions that produce milk for
manufacturing uses, the losses from allowing product prices to  fall to world market levels
are  offset by  gains  from eliminating milk  marketing  orders.  These  simulations  suggest,
therefore, that, under current regulations,  producers in markets with high Class I utilization
gain  more from the price discrimination maintained  by the milk marketing orders  than do
regions with low Class I utilization.
As noted above and shown in Table 4, U.S. aggregate  farm production and price each
decline by about 2.5 percent ($0.33/cwt) and total revenue falls by 5 percent ($949 million).
3
Consumer outlays are projected to decline by 4 percent, ($0.7  billion) (Table 5).  The direct
government  budget costs  under this  option  are  $146  million  annually,  due  solely  to  the
transition payments ($0. 10/cwt on 145,970 million pounds of milk production). Government
costs are $295 million less than BASE outlays (Table 6).
Table  6 also provides an indication of likely exports under  a deregulation scenario.
Exports of butter fall by  8 percent to  293 million pounds and  exports of NDM  falls by  90
percent to 42 million pounds.  Exports of the solids rich residual manufacturing  aggregate
remain unchanged (372 million pounds).  In contrast,  exports of American cheese fall to zero
as domestic  U.S. prices remain well above world market prices.
3At the higher world market prices these aggregate declines are smaller:  -1 percent on
price and -3 percent on revenues.
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Table 6.  Endogenous  Sector  Summary:  Price  Support Purchases  (If Products  are
Supported) and/or Commercial Exports (If Products are Not Supported)
Freedom  to  House  1996 Fair Act  No CCC:  Low  No CCC: High
BASE  Milk  Compromise  Dairy Title  World Prices  World Prices
(%)  (%)  (0%  )  (/)  (%)
QUANTITIES  (MILLION  POUNDS)
American  Cheese  161  0  116  31  0  0
Butter  318  293  575  473  403  70
Nonfat  Dry Milk  383  42  365  353  52  192
Residual  Manufacturing  372  372  0  372  372  382
MINIMUM DOMESTIC  PRICES ($/CWT) /  a
American  Cheese  112.00  114.78  112.50  109.80  101.17  107.64
Butter  65.00  58.99  58.99  65.00  58.99  72.00
Nonfat Dry Milk  103.40  59.62  59.62  100.30  59.62  79.62
Residual  Manufacturing  33.60  33.60  34.01  33.60  33.60  33.60
WORLD  PRICES ($/CWT) /  b
American Cheese  82.72  82.72  82.72  82.72  82.72  97.20
Butter  68.99  68.99  68.99  68.99  68.99  82.00
Nonfat Dry Milk  69.62  69.62  69.62  69.62  69.62  89.60
Transport Cost /  c  10.00  10.00  10.00  1000  10.00  10.00
Government/DEIP Cost /  d  101  (0)  2  94  0  0
Other Government  Costs /  e,f  340  146  126  428  0  0
Total Government  Costs /  g  441  146  128  522  0  0
Change  from BASE  (295)  (314)  81  (441)  (441)
%  Change  from  BASE  -67%  -71%  18%  -10(0%  -100%
Notes:
a)  Minimum domestic  prices are either  Price Floors (at $10.10  CCC levels  or World Market Prices +  transportation to North European  Ports) or
the lowest regional  price in the current  solution (usually California).
b)  World market prices are 5  year averages (1994-98)  from  FAPRI's 4/95 BASELINE,  except for NO CCC:  High World Prices which  are from
FAPRl's  10/95 BASELINE.
c) Approximate  transport costs to move products  to North European  ports or Pacific Rim.
d) DEIP costs computed  as Domestic Price -World Market  Price +  Transport Costs,  using 5 year  average  DEIP Maximums (1994-98): American
cheese,  4 million pounds;  butter, 70 million pounds; NDM, 217 million pounds.
e)  BASE Other  Government Costs are computed  as (Exports -DEIP Maximum) *  Domestic  Price -1993 Assessments  ($0.1125/cwt).  Note  that
this includes the  1993 Government release of  14 million pounds of American Cheese and 201 million pounds of butter (i.e., around $146 million
at $10. 10 CCC prices).  Excludes  Residual  Manufacturing  Costs.  Freedom to Farm costs are the transition  payment  ($0.1 0/cwt) times total milk
production  (145,970 million pounds).
t)  Note that the House Compromise and Dairy  Title do not have budget assessments  to offset the cost of the government price support  and DEIP
programs.  The lack of assessments  explain why  the projected Dairy Title  government costs are higher than  BASE despite  lower  CCC purchase
prices.
g)  Total  Government  Endogenous Costs does not  include  the costs of Government  purchases  to meet  the 5 year average  Domestic  Donations of
butter, NDM, and American  Cheese (71.3,  27.5, and  102.8 million pounds respectively)  assumed to be exogenous  ONLY in the  BASE scenario.
At 1993 support prices, the  cost of these  donations would be around $200  million.
The House  Compromise (1/25/96)
The House Compromise proposed a package  of complex significant  policy changes
affecting fluid  and manufacturing milk markets.  Each of  the major policy provisions  is listed
here  separately,  but,  it  must  be  stressed,  the  impacts  of the  proposal  depends  on  their
simultaneous  implementation.
Existing federal  and state  milk marketing  orders  are retained but minimum fluid
prices are kept 2 years  at $12.87  plus BASE Class I differentials.  These relativelyCox and Sumner
high minimum prices reflect the tight milk supply (due to unusually hot weather and
high grain prices) that characterized  the U.S. dairy sector in the fall of 1995.
* A national pool is created for $0.80/cwt of fluid revenues at the average U.S. Class
I utilization (about 40 percent).
* California  fluid milk protein  standards  are  imposed  nationwide;  this  raises  the
nonfat  solids in fluid milk (as well as  fluid prices) and raises the demand  for nonfat
solids.
* The California marketing order is retained, but California participates in the national
Class I pool.
* The price support on butter and NDM is eliminated.
* The producer assessments  are eliminated.
* Price support on American  cheese  is raised  from $10.10  (in the BASE) to $10.35.
The  cheese  support  is phased  down  $0.10/year  for 5 years  generating  a  5 year
average  support  level  of $10.15/cwt  ($1.125/pound  versus  $1.12/pound  in  the
BASE) which we use in our simulations.
* The most complex change is the creation of a 50 percent Class IV pool to replace
the government purchase program for butter and NDM.  This program  is similar to
a farmer financed,  target price-deficiency  payment scheme where 50 percent of the
difference between the cheese support price and the price of milk used in butter and
NDM evaluated  at world market prices  (roughly $6.20/cwt  under our low world
price scenario) is recovered from a national pool that is assessed on all dairy farmers
on the basis of their production.  An assessment of about $0.16/cwt  on all milk in
required to cover 50  percent of the losses  from dropping the price  support.  By
maintaining a price differential,  this program provides considerable  incentives  for
manufacturers  to  make  cheese  rather  than  butter  and  NDM.  Offsetting  these
incentives are a generous "make allowance"  on butter/NDM production  ($1.60/cwt)
and the nationwide California fluid standards which raises demand for nonfat solids
and  shifts  milk  away  from  cheese.  Due to these  factors,  in  the simulations we
assume exogenously that NDM production expands a minimum of 10 percent over
BASE quantities.
* The domestic donations of about 2.4 billion pounds (METS) that are included in the
BASE scenario are dropped.
Two  additional  elements  contained  in  the  House  Compromise proposal  are  not
modelled.  Neither the stand-by pool nor the unspecified reform of federal marketing orders
that is to occur after 2 years have specific or quantifiable  elements that lend themselves to
explicit modelling.  Therefore, rather than speculate on their form, these policy elements are
not included  in the simulation of this option.
Under the House Compromise, butter and  NDM  prices  fall  to near  world  market
levels, hence  facilitating  exports.  To the  extent that the Class IV pool successfully shifts
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milk into  export markets  and tightens domestic  markets  for other products  (cheese,  fluid,
soft,  and frozen  products, etc.),  the  U.S.  dairy  industry  would  gain revenue  by reducing
supplies along inelastic product demand  functions.
Due  to  the  very high  minimum  fluid prices  and the  additional  solids fortification
induced by nationwide California fluid standards,  this scenario is projected to increase  fluid
prices  by  about  10 percent  ($1.45/cwt,  12.5  cents/gallon),  decrease  fluid production  and
consumption  by about 2 percent  (1.0 billion pounds), and increase  fluid revenues by about
8 percent ($621  million, Table  3).  Given that aggregate milk production rises by 0.7 percent
(roughly  1 billion pounds,  Table  4),  there  is considerable  additional  milk  available  for
manufacturing  usage  which tends to  lower prices  and revenues  for milk used  to produce
manufactured  dairy products.
The simulations suggest that the combination of California fluid standards nationwide
and Class IV pooling as modelled here, successfully  raise domestic prices.  By construction,
NDM production expands  10 percent above BASE levels (as  does butter) (Table 3).  Butter
prices fall  by  11  percent  (7 cents/pound)  and NDM prices fall by about 43 percent (in both
cases the resulting prices are equal  to prices prevailing in world export markets).  Production
of residual  manufactured  products,  a key source  of milk solids used  in fortification  (whey
solids,  evaporated/condensed  milk,  whole milk powders)  fall by  10 percent (422  million
pounds).  Total  cheese production  falls  by  about  2  percent  (147  million pounds)  while
American  cheese declines  by 2 percent  (67 million pounds).  American  cheese prices fall
slightly relative to BASE, while prices of Italian cheese and other cheese rise (11  percent and
2 percent), hence generating  added revenue  from these cheese markets (Table  3).  The CCC
purchases  116 million pounds of  American cheese at  1.125/pound ($128 million),  generating
a 70 percent  decrease in total government  outlays relative to BASE (Table  6).
Farm level results, summarized  on a regional  basis in Table 4,  indicate that producers
in several  markets with high Class I utilization (e.g., North East, South Atlantic,  South East,
Central, East South Central) tend to have lower prices, production and revenue relative to the
BASE  scenario.  These  losses,  however,  are  generally  quite  small (less  than  1 percent).
Further, the precision of the model means that regional changes  of this magnitude  cannot be
distinguished confidently  from no change.  The higher  fluid prices and more Class I revenue
induced by this policy are offset by losses due to national Class I pooling.  It should also  be
noted that the losses  in the high  Class I utilization  markets are considerably less than under
the Freedom to Milk deregulation scenario.
Regions with low Class I utilization have modest price and revenue  gains relative  to
the BASE scenario,  generally  in the  range of 1 percent to 2 percent for price,  and slightly
higher for revenue  (2 percent to 4 percent).  Regions  such as California,  the Upper Midwest,
and the North West have  slightly higher gains-3 percent to 5 percent on price and about 3
percent to 5 percent on revenues (Table 4).
Average farm prices are projected to rise by  1.7 percent (22 cents/cwt) and production
increases by 0.7 percent (1 billion pounds).  Aggregate farm revenue  increases by 2.4 percent
($458  million, Table  4).  Wholesale costs  to consumers  are projected  to rise by  3 percent
152Cox and  Sumner
($567 million) over the BASE (of this the costs rise by  8 percent,  or $621  million,  for fluid
milk consumers and decline for consumers of other products).  Government purchases  of
American  cheese decline  slightly  from the BASE scenario  and total  government outlays
decline by 71 percent ($314 million,  Table 5).
Due to the Class IV pool and elimination of price supports, butter exports increase by
80 percent to 575 million pounds while NDM exports dip by only  5 percent to 365 million
pounds  (Table 6).  These results indicate that the Class IV pool,  as modelled  in this scenario,
successfully increases commercial  exports of butter and NDM.
The 1996 FAIR Act Dairy Title
The dairy policy reform that became  law in April  1996 calls for much more modest
changes from the BASE than the two scenarios just discussed.  While a number of detailed
provisions are included in the  law, the reforms that have quantifiable implications  for milk
markets  are few.  (See Jesse and Cropp for a detailed discussion of the dairy provisions  of
the FAIR Act.)
The  1996 FAIR Act Dairy Title provides  marginal changes from current policy  over
the next 3 to 5 years.  The dairy price support program is phased down  15 cents/cwt per year
from $10.35/cwt,  and completely eliminated by the year 2000 (at which time it is replaced
with a recourse  loan program).  Given the recent strength of dairy product markets (which
is likely to continue for several  years due to high  grain and other feed prices), the impacts of
phasing out federal  price supports will likely be minimal.  However,  assessments  on dairy
producers  are  eliminated  immediately,  which  does  have  a  direct  impact  on  producers.
Section 102 of the 1990 Food Agriculture Conservation and Trade Act (which mandated that
no  state could use manufactured  product to make  allowances  higher than used under the
federal dairy price support program) is repealed.  This provision was never implemented  and
it's repeal will have minor (if any) impacts.
The  1996  Dairy  Title  does  not  provide  for  any  specific  changes  in  federal  or
California  milk marketing orders-BASE  classified  pricing and Class  I differentials,  and
current California pricing (with California fluid  standards in California) are  all maintained
in the simulation.  USDA  is required to consolidate  current  orders to between  10 and  14
within three years. USDA  is authorized  to consider  using both multiple  basing points and
fluid milk utilization rates in setting Class I prices in the consolidated orders, and to consider
uniform multiple  component pricing in designing  a new basic Formula Price.  Under this
legislation, California may become one of the  10-14  federal orders (if California producers
petition  and  approve  a  federal  order).  None  of these  provisions  provide  any  directly
quantifiable impacts on milk markets.
The  1996  FAIR  Act  Dairy  Title  extends  and  fully  funds  DEIP  through  2002,
authorizes USDA to assist in forming export trading companies, and authorizes the National
Dairy Board to use funds for export market development.  Other major provisions  include
the  exemption  of California  from  federal  standards  of identity  for  fluid milk (that  is,  it
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explicitly  allows  California  fluid  standards  in  California)  and  allows  the  Secretary  of
Agriculture  to  authorize  the Northeast  Dairy  Compact  (which  allows  northeast  states  to
collectively set higher minimum fluid prices than mandated under the federal order structure)
for a limited time and under fairly stringent  conditions.
In terms of modelling, the Dairy Title of the FAIR Act of 1996 is almost identical to
the BASE, but without budget assessments, and with a $9.90 milk price support that implies
a reduction by  3 percent in the NDM price floor ($1.003/pound versus $1.034/pound  at a
$10.10/cwt milk price support) and a reduction  by 3 percent in the American cheese price
floor (to $1.098/pound).  Butter supports are kept unchanged  from the BASE at $0.65/pound.
This scenario as modelled, does not incorporate any market order reform nor any Northeast
Dairy Compact effects.  Lastly, this scenario drops the government  domestic donations  (of
2.4 billion pounds METS).
The  1996  FAIR Act Dairy Title scenario  has  minimal  impacts  on wholesale  fluid
markets:  average fluid prices fall by  1.7 percent ($0.24/cwt)  and production increases by 0.3
percent  (166  million  pounds)  compared  to  BASE.  Lower  American  cheese  and  NDM
incentives  (due  to  the  lower  $9.90  versus  $10.10  price  supports)  result  in  a  decline  in
American  cheese production  by 4.4 percent  (137 million  pounds) and  a decline  in NDM
production by  1.6 percent (16 million pounds).  Other wholesale  level changes are minimal
(see Table  3).
Farm prices  and revenues  are  projected  to decline  slightly relative to BASE in  all
regions (see  Table 4).  Across the regions  listed in Table 4,  milk prices  fall  1 percent to 2
percent while milk revenues  fall by  1 percent to 3 percent.  The National average milk price
falls by about  1 percent (14 cents/cwt) while  aggregate milk revenues decline  by 1.7 percent
($322 million).  Aggregate producer  surplus falls by 0.8 percent ($21  million) (Table 5).
Aggregate  consumer expenditures  (at wholesale)  fall by  1.4  percent ($269 million)
while  consumer  welfare  increases  by  0.8  percent  ($35  million)  (Table  5).  Annual
government expenditures  due to the price support program  are projected to be $522 million
after  a 3 to 5 year  adjustment  period.  This  is an  18  percent ($81  million)  increase  over
BASE.  Under this  scenario  the government  purchases  31  million pounds  of American
cheese, 473 million pounds of butter, and 353 million pounds of NDM (Table 6).  In contrast
to the BASE scenario,  however,  there are no budget assessments to offset the cost of these
purchases.  Therefore net government expenditures increase despite the considerably smaller
purchases  of American  cheese  compared  to  BASE.  DEIP  expenditures  are  about  $94
million.  If these projections  do prevail,  there will likely be pressure to manage these levels
of butter and NDM removals,  (beyond the DEIP limits)  to avoid the build up of government
stocks.
No  CCC:  With Alternative Assumptions on World Prices
Under the FAIR Act the  federal dairy price support program is scheduled to end by
the  year 2000.  It is therefore  of particular  interest  to consider  the impacts  of alternative
world  market prices  for butter, NDM  and  cheese  at the  end of a  3 to  5 year  adjustment
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period.  Two scenarios were examined that are identical to the  1996  FAIR Act Dairy Title
except that they drop butter, NDM, and American cheese price supports and allow domestic
prices  for these products to  fall to world market levels.  Given our uncertainty  over future
world market prices, both low  and high world market price assumptions are used to provide
bounds on the likely impacts of elimination of the federal dairy price support program by the
year 2000.  As mentioned  earlier, the low world price assumptions yield butter and NDM
milk  equivalent  prices  around  $6.20/cwt;  whereas  the  high  price  scenario  yields  milk
equivalent prices of about $8.50/cwt (see footnote 2 for more detail).
The impacts on the wholesale fluid sector are considerably larger when product prices
are allowed to fall to the world prices  rather than being supported at the U.S.  government
purchase  prices  as was assumed  under the FAIR Act Dairy Title scenario.  Average  fluid
prices  decline  by  6.6  percent  ($0.92./cwt)  with  low  world  prices  and  by  3.3  percent
($0.46/cwt) under the high world price assumptions (Table  3).  Given these  lower prices,
fluid milk production and consumption is projected to expand by  1.2 percent  (633 million
pounds)  under low world prices and by 0.6 percent under low high world price assumptions.
Domestic prices for American cheese fall sharply (10.4 percent) under low world prices, (5.1
percent) under high world prices, but do not fall to world market levels in either scenario.
American cheese production falls by 4 percent to  5 percent, while total cheese production
falls by  1.7 percent under low world price assumptions.
Butter and NDM prices adjust to world market levels under both of these scenarios.
As shown in Table 3, aggregate butter price declines by 8.9 percent (5.4 cent/pound) under
low world  prices, but  increases  by  14  percent  (9  cents/pound)  under high world  prices.
Butter production  falls  by  roughly  4 percent  (50  million pounds)  under both scenarios.
Commercial exports remain strong (403 million pounds) under low world prices, but decline
sharply  to  70  million pounds  under  high world prices  (Table  6).  The impacts  of world
market prices  on wholesale NDM markets are even larger: NDM prices decline by 42 percent
under the  low world  price  conditions  and  by  about  23  percent  under high  world prices.
Similarly, NDM production  also declines by about 23 percent under low prices  but by  13
percent with the high world price assumptions (Table 3).  Note that commercial exports of
NDM drop sharply under both of these scenarios: exports decline by 83 percent to 52 million
pounds under low world price assumptions and by 50 percent to  192 million pounds under
the high price assumptions  (Table  6).  Aggregate  consumer  expenditures  (at  wholesale)
decline  by 4  percent ($750  million)  while consumer  surplus increases  by 2 percent  ($86
million) under low world prices.  With high world prices consumer  costs fall by 2.8 percent
and consumer surplus rises by  1.5 percent (Table 5).
Given  these wholesale  market  impacts,  it  is  not  surprising  that farm  prices  and
revenues  in  all  regions  are  projected  to  decline  relative  to BASE  under  both  of these
scenarios:  the ranges are  1 percent to  6 percent under low world prices and  0.4 percent to
4.4 percent under high world prices.  Average  U.S. milk prices  are projected to decline  4.3
percent or 55  cents/cwt  relative to BASE  under low world prices (the effect is roughly half
as large under high world prices)  (Table  3).  Across the  regions  shown in  Table 4,  milk
revenues decline by 1 percent to about  13 percent under low worlds prices, and decline by
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0.5 percent  to  10.4 percent under high world prices.  Table 5 provides  aggregate producer
effects.  Aggregate  milk  revenue  declines  by  6.6  percent  ($1.251  billion)  and  producer
surplus declines by 3 percent ($81  million) under low world prices.  Under high world prices,
milk revenues  fall by 3.7 percent ($0.694 billion) while aggregate producer  surplus declines
by  1.6  percent  ($44  million).  Under  both  of these  scenarios,  there  are  no  government
expenditures because  there are no price supports.
CAVEATS  AND  MODELLING LIMITATIONS
The Dairy IRCM used to assess the likely impacts of these alternative policy scenarios
has several limitations that should be mentioned  again before proceeding  to the concluding
section.  First,  the  model  measures  the  impacts  expected  to  occur  over  a  3  to  5 year
adjustment period and assumed that all dairy products have equilibrium prices based on the
prices of the milk components used in their production.  However,  the BASE model results
suggest that the U.S. dairy sector does  not yet price fully on a component basis.  Further, the
model does not incorporate  shipment  of intermediate  products (skim milk and cream) and
does  not  allow  for  reconstitution.  Additional  research  is  underway  to  address  these
limitations.
Also,  the  model  specifies  relatively  elastic  regional  supplies  of  manufactured
products.  That is, the model does not incorporate "brick and mortar" with respect to regional
processing capacity, hence likely allows for more change  in regional processing profiles than
might be expected to occur over a 3 to 5 year period.  Thus, the results provide an indication
of what regional processing  would look like if the U.S.  dairy sector maximized  returns to
farm level  milk components.
The model also does not incorporate the impacts of additional  factors such as changes
in and impacts  of NAFTA  and GATT,  emerging markets (both on the supply and demand
side),  trade  disputes,  world supply  demand balance,  etc.  Given the  nature  of U.S.  trade
policy  for dairy, we do not see these omissions as  crucial.
The  Dairy  IRCM  demonstrates  the  kinds  of changes  in  production,  prices,  and
interregional  trade that would likely  occur if federal  dairy programs  were modified.  The
model  emphasizes that prices  are interrelated  among regions  and products.  It also shows
how,  as a result of these interrelationships, changes that have primary effects  in one region
or on one product spill over into all other regions and products.  This is particularly  true for
the  impacts  on  regions  with high Class  I utilization  and  fluid  production  versus regions
specializing in production of manufactured dairy products.
The Dairy IRCM does  a reasonably good job of representing the complex U.S. milk
marketing and pricing system, but it is only a mathematical  simulation model.  Its projections
must be  interpreted carefully and tempered by market  experience and intuition.  Any model
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must be used as only one tool among many that should be used together in the process of
gaining an understanding of the potential  impacts of changes in agricultural policy.
SUMMARY  AND  IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS
The simulations discussed above have emphasized  a variety of national and regional
impacts of several policy options (and two additional variants)  on prices, production,  and
industry revenues within the U.S. dairy sector.  It may be useful to summarize the underlying
economics  that  drives  the  implications  of  each  policy  before  going  on  to  consider
implications for Canada-U.S.  dairy trade and trade relations of the dairy policy changes in
FAIR Act of 1996.
The proposals considered  in the dairy policy  debate that lead to the FAIR Act had
several common  elements.  None of these proposals included lower import barriers and  all
include full funding of export subsidies under the DEIP.  Further, all proposals,  provided for
elimination of the dairy  farmer assessments  instituted  in  1990  and reduced price  support
activities by the USDA.  Before passage of the relatively  modest changes included  in the
FAIR Act, the U.S. Congress seriously considered the much more dramatic changes  in milk
market regulations that were analysed in detail above.
The Freedom to Milk policy would have eliminated the price support program and the
dairy marketing orders.  Such a policy would reduce transfers to the dairy industry from both
consumers and taxpayers.  It would also allow changes in regional production patterns.  The
simulations indicate that the regional distortions created by marketing orders are so large that
producers  in  major dairy  regions  that have relatively  low milk  prices, would  gain  from
eliminating the whole system of support and regulations.  Such a system would allow more
milk to be produced  in lower cost regions,  but because the price of fluid milk falls and less
milk is produced  in high cost regions, the system also implies  that more  of that milk from
California and the Upper Midwest would be used in fluid products.  Therefore,  given import
barriers, U.S.  dairy product prices remain above world prices and exports are minimal.
Another failed proposal,  the House Compromise favoured by significant parts of the
dairy  industry,  would  have eliminated  the  government  purchase  program  for butter  and
NDM,  but raised the price  support  for cheese.  It also included  a  whole set  of complex
rearrangements  of subsidies and pricing regulations  that would have left dairy markets  at
least as heavily regulated as before.  The House Compromise policy is such a complex mix
of program  changes  that  it  defies  simple  summary.  It  is  clearly  not  deregulation  and
increases,  rather than  reduces, many of the distortions  of the current  system.  As may be
observed  from Tables  5 and 6, this proposal  shifts an even higher proportion of the dairy
program subsidy from tax payers to consumers of dairy products.  It also shifts some of the
consumer cost to domestic consumers of cheese relative to consumers of butter.
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The increased use of non-fat solids in fluid milk also increases the transfers from fluid
consumers to producers  of NDM.  By eliminating the price support  on butter and NDM, the
proposal  could  facilitate  export  of these  commodities,  but  little  increase  in  exports  is
projected  under our analysis.  Export expansion  is limited primarily because regional  and
product realignments predominate and because increased use of NDM to fortify fluid milk
reduces the availability of NDM for export.  The two new national pooling schemes together
with the different treatment of NDM and butter relative to cheese  seem to keep the mix of
manufactured products  similar to what is produced  now.  There  does, however,  seem to be
an incentive for reduced production of butter and NDM relative to cheese  in the period over
which the price support would have been binding.
The FAIR Act gradually reduces  the support price over 4 years  from $10.35 in  1996
to $9.90 in 1999 and eliminates the price support program for subsequent  years.  The FAIR
Act includes some language encouraging modifications  of the marketing order system, but
provides  little  guidance  as  to  the  form  of the  new price  or marketing  regulations.  The
simulations reported as FAIR ACTDAIRY TITLE in Table 3 through 6 include the effects of
the price  support reduction  to $9.90 and  the elimination  of the producer assessment  The
elimination  of the price support program that is  a part of the FAIR Act is considered  in the
two final  simulations.  These simulations indicate the FAIR Act implications  (relevant for
the  year  2000  and  beyond)  under  two  alternative  projections  of world  dairy  market
conditions.  Thus, to understand the likely effects of the dairy policy changes that the United
States adopted in  1996, we should consider  each of the final three simulations.
The three  simulations  used to represent  the FAIR  Act all  show lower milk prices,
lower  farm  incomes,  and lower consumer  costs  in the  United  States.  Because there  is no
marketing order reform, there is little regional variation  in the  losses to producers except that
producers  in  regions  that  rely  most  on  production  of manufactured  dairy  products  lose
slightly more than producers in other regions.
Each of the simulations presented respond  to the  question: under market conditions
that prevailed in  the  base period  (roughly  1993),  what  would  have been the  outcome  if,
instead of the policies  that prevailed at that time (BASE), the United  States would have had
specific alternative policy?  For the FAIR Act program we examine  this question,  under the
assumption  of relatively  low world  dairy  prices,  first  for  the  period  for which the  price
support of $9.90/cwt applies (scheduled  for  1999 under the FAIR Act).  We then examine
the  question again, under the case of no price support program  (which  is terminated  after
1999 under the FAIR Act).  Because of the potential  importance of world market conditions
when the  U.S.  price support  has  been eliminated  we examine  this last  case again  with a
higher set of world dairy prices.
Note that these simulations  are not designed to provide predictions of the most likely
implications of the FAIR Act for the 1996-2002 period.  The underlying market conditions
expected over the life of the FAIR Act have important  implications  for its effects,  and these
market  conditions  are  likely to  differ  from those that prevailed  in the  1993  base period.
However,  comparing  the  simulations  to  the  base,  and  to  each  other,  helps  us  better
understand the alternative polices.
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During  1995  and  1996, high grain prices and other factors have caused the price of
milk and dairy products  to be relatively high-well  above the USDA purchase  prices  for
cheese, butter and NDM.  The result has been very low USDA acquisition of stocks  and very
low government costs.  If these high price conditions were to continue,  say because  grain
prices continue  to be high, then a gradual elimination of the price support program would
have little effect.  If simulations were prepared under the conditions of high underlying milk
prices, then we would find quite minor consequences of the FAIR Act, under either the $9.90
support price or under elimination of the price support program.  With high market prices the
price support program becomes almost irrelevant  and major impact of the FAIR Act would
be the elimination of the producer assessment.
The FAIR Act was prepared when many projections were that high grain prices and
relatively high prices  for milk would continue.  This allowed  analysts to conclude that the
price support program provided  limited gains to producers which were easily offset by the
elimination  of producer  assessments.  Further,  by  allowing  market  forces  to have more
influence  over  the relative  prices of manufactured  dairy  products,  the FAIR Act  might
facilitate  exports of some dairy products during periods  when U.S. prices are low or world
prices are high.
Our simulations  show that the provision  for a lower  support price does affect  farm
prices and incomes  directly when market conditions are such that relatively low U.S. prices
and low world prices prevail.  No one really knows what market conditions will be over the
next 7 years  and, properly interpreted, the simulations provide useful guidance to potential
consequences of the FAIR Act over this period.
CONCLUSION:  IMPLICATIONS FOR RELATIONS  WITH CANADA
What are the implications of these policy  options for dairy trade and trade relations
with Canada?  First,  it should be stressed that, with present barriers in place, there are few
if any direct effects  of U.S. policy on exports  to Canada,  Nor, with U.S.  barriers  and the
current  Canadian  policies,  are  there  direct  implications  for  imports  from  Canada.  No
proposed  U.S.  dairy program  could lower the  Canadian tariff wall  or reduce U.S.  prices
enough that product would flow over that wall.  That said, each of the policies considered
may change trade incentives  or otherwise affect the political pressures on trade policy.
Policies  such  as Freedom to Milk would allow  a  more  market  oriented domestic
industry with declining product prices.  A new  orientation, plus reduced total revenue  and
lower prices  might increase pressure  for more access to Canadian markets.  Offsetting this
effect,  however,  is  reduced  price  discrimination  in  the U.S.  This  means  that low-cost
production regions that had produced mainly manufactured dairy products, shift more milk
to fluid uses.  As a result, average milk prices in these low cost regions are projected to rise.
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The key question  for this option is:  what sort of political  pressures on trade would emerge
in a much  less regulated  dairy industry?
The House Compromise proposal would have reshuffled,  but not dismantled the array
of dairy policy tools.  It would have modified intra-industry  revenue flows from the existing
price discrimination pattern and creates new price  discrimination  instruments.  None of this
affects trade with Canada directly, but lower prices of potentially exportable  butter and NDM
might have increased pressure  for exports to Canada.  If such pressure on Canadian policy
were to occur, Canadians would be sure to point out the export subsidy characteristics of the
House Compromise Class IV pooling program.  This policy, by transferring revenues  within
the  industry,  while  simultaneously  raising U.S.  consumer  prices  and  lowering  potential
export  prices,  could  be  seen  as  an  indirect  export  subsidy  under  the  Uruguay  Round
agreement  (Sumner).
Let us conclude with a discussion of the most likely effects of the FAIR Act for dairy
trade and trade relations with  Canada.  Consider  the case of a gradual or partial opening of
the U.S. -Canadian border, as discussed,  for example,  in the Barichello and Romain chapter
in this volume.  Their analysis of Canadian milk quota programs suggests  that, with lower
border barriers, the potential for imports from the United States would most likely be met by
a reduction  in the regulated  high prices in Canada and lower quota rents rather than by an
attempt  to  maintain  high  prices  in  the  face  of imports.  Further,  the  lower  the  effective
potential import price from the United States,  the more Canadian prices must decline  in order
to avoid imports.  Barichello  and Romain,  among others,  argue that U.S. prices have been
high  enough,  and  Canadian  quotas  tight enough,  so that  the  effect of much  lower tariffs
would  be  much  lower prices  in  Canada,  and that  no trade need  actually  occur.  Clearly,
information about the effective export prices of dairy products from the United States is vital
in  determining the effect of lower tariffs on milk prices  and quota values in Canada.  The
FAIR Act has direct implications  for those potential  export prices.
The direct  impact of the FAIR Act  is to reduce the  support prices  for manufactured
dairy products that are most heavily traded on world markets.  The simulations show that the
FAIR Act allows  the  prices of NDM and  cheese,  in particular,  to  decline relative  to the
BASE.  Further,  the FAIR Act continues  the marketing  order system which, through price
discrimination,  lowers the  price of manufactured  dairy products.  Marketing  orders  also
restrict  trade  of milk  within  the  United  States  and  create  many  regional  markets.  Our
simulations show that the FAIR Act lowers  farm milk prices  most in several regions,  such
as the North West, California and the Upper Midwest,  which may be most suited to export
to Canada.  We  do not include  simulations  to project exports  to Canada under alternative
Canadian  policies, but the  factors just discussed indicate  that the  FAIR Act would  place
additional pressure on Canadian milk prices and quota rents, and increase  the potential  for
exports to Canada from the United  States.
The additional trade pressure may raise some additional trade tensions.  By scheduling
the elimination of the price support program, the FAIR Act makes the price discrimination
aspects of U.S. dairy policy more transparent  and important.  As noted above, U.S. policies
may cause the price of milk used in potential  export products  (such as NDM and butter) to
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be below the price of milk received by U.S. producers (which is a blend price) and below the
average prices  paid by buyers who  make products directed towards the domestic market.
(This average  is more likely to include products  required by marketing orders  to be made
with higher priced milk.)  If lower tariffs between the United States and Canada eventually
open the border to potential trade, this stimulation to exports implied by U.S. policy may well
raise concerns or objections  within Canada.
Finally,  it should be noted again that, in  1995 and  1996, dairy product prices  in the
United  States have been well above the support prices.  If these market conditions were to
continue, the FAIR Act would have relatively little effect on potential export prices  except
that producer assessment that raised cost of production most for the most efficient producers
have been eliminated.
Even though none of the policy options we have considered has direct consequences
for trade flows under present import barriers, each does have implications that may affect
pressure  for changes in trade relations,  and they do have export implications if trade barriers
are  reduced.  We  do  not speculate  here on  the  likelihood  of major reductions  in border
barriers.  U.S. import barriers may not be as high or as distorting as those in Canada, but they
do create a major subsidy for the U.S. dairy industry, and seem to be politically secure.  This
could make it difficult for the United  States to advocate open markets for dairy trade.  But,
of course, nations seldom find it troubling to condemn another country's policies, even when
they have similar distortions at home.
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